Trust is a key term in social sciences and organizational research. Trust as well is a term that originates from and speaks to our human relational experience. The first part of the paper explores trust as it is interpreted within contemporary sociology and organizational research, and systematically questions five basic assumptions underlying the interpretation of trust in organizational research. The last part of the paper reviews selected phenomenological methodological studies of trust in work life situations, in a quest for how (...) experiential trust can emerge and be studied in professional organizations. We suggest looking for the “in-betweens” or spaces of possibilities within organizational structures, roles and tasks for emerging, experiential trust. (shrink)

The present account, based on introspective comments, deals with motivation and hedonic tone as subjective factors which affect continuous work at high speeds. Actual introspective reports are given. The earlier papers in the series described the experimental procedure and presented objective data.

A half century of intensive educational propaganda has finally had its fitting effect: astrological notions are being assimilated these days in our country with striking ease and moreover above all by educated, so to speak enlightened, people. It has become good tone to listen on every occasion to the forecasts of fashionable astrologers, to interview them, and to print computer horoscopes. The traditional skepticism of our scientists barely suffices them to keep their own scientific view of the world intact. (...) But if any understanding is to be achieved about the phenomenon of the present-day astrological renaissance, it can only be done in connection with science. For over two thousand years, astrology has endeavored to become a respectable science, and for this reason alone, any analytical approach to astrological material must, in any event initially, regard this material as scientific. (shrink)

In today's business world, ethics is not simply a peripheral concern of executive boards or a set of supposed constraints on free enterprise. Ethics stands at the very core of our working lives and of society as a whole, defining the public image of the business community and the ways in which individual companies and people behave. What people do at work--and how they think about work--determines their attitudes and aspirations, affecting and even structuring their personal lives and habits. Working (...) from this premise, Honest Work: A Business Ethics Reader provides a practical overview of business ethics that concentrates on the ethical problems and dilemmas students are most likely to face in their prospective work environments. Classic and recent articles and cases cover a broad spectrum of issues and concerns--from private ethical dilemmas to larger considerations of corporate values--and propose guidelines for thinking about the business world in a moral context. Each reading and case is followed by lively questions for discussion. Offering a welcome alternative to the impersonal tone of most business ethics texts, the editors address students in an appealing and conversational manner. They provide engaging chapter introductions that include personal narratives and also present the ideas of great philosophers in a unique way--as emails. Ideal for introductory undergraduate and MBA courses in business ethics, Honest Work: A Business Ethics Reader can be read as a coherent narrative but also offers instructors great flexibility, as its various chapters, readings, and cases can be pursued in almost any order. A Companion Website featuring chapter objectives and summaries, study questions, self-tests, and off-site links of interest will soon be available. An Instructor's Manual with Test Bank is available to adopters. (shrink)

With this work, the author terminates his trilogy on nationally prominent philosophers in Germany, France, and the United States, respectively. In all three works a deliberate attempt is made to counter the current trend towards linguistic analysis and deal with philosophy in its classical meaning as a body of general truths about the universe as a whole, which the author believes leads to some important consequences of present day relevance. The style of the work, to say the least, is unusual (...) in that it is cast in the form of a series of letters, fourteen in number, of a father to his daughter. Since he admits there are no German, French, or American "philosophies," properly speaking, each letter deals with a particular North American philosopher, beginning with Jonathan Edwards, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Paine in Revolutionary days, continuing with Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead as 19th century representatives, and Whitehead, Santayana, and Carnap for the first half of the twentieth. The work concludes with Hans Kelsen and Marcuse, who like Carnap, came to the United States as the result of Hitler’s antisemitism. The tenor of the work lays stress on problems of cultural and political life and, thereby, on the ties of this sort that bind the United States and Europe. The work reads well, and although its tone is more biographical than philosophical, more expository than critical, it could well serve as supplementary reading for a seminar on American philosophy.—A.B.W. (shrink)

These fragmentary and often repetitious papers-some of them published before Schutz's death--are organized under three headings: 1) On the Methodology of the Social Sciences, 2) Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, and 3) Symbol, Reality and Society. Schutz elaborates the structures of the "natural attitude," earlier described by Husserl, and defends the irreducible reality of the Lebenswelt which is necessarily presupposed by science, knowledge, language, and the interpretation of signs. Intersubjectivity is at the core of the Lebenswelt and Schutz ably criticizes (...) the inadequate work done by Husserl, Scheler and Sartre on the problem of the other. The tone of all the papers is expository and critical rather than original, as if Schutz was preparing his own views by "working through" a host of other writers.--A. B. D. (shrink)

To examine whether anticipatory attention or expectancy is a cognitive process that is automatic or requires conscious control, we employed a paired-stimulus event-related potential paradigm during the transition to sleep. The slow negative ERP wave observed between two successive stimuli, the Contingent Negative Variation , reflects attention and expectancy to the second stimulus. Thirteen good sleepers were instructed to respond to the second stimulus in a pair during waking sessions. In a non-response paradigm modified for sleep, participants then fell asleep (...) while tones played. As expected, N1 decreased and P2 increased in amplitude systematically with the loss of consciousness at sleep onset; the CNV was increasingly more positive. Sleep onset latency was correlated with the amplitude of the CNV. The systematic attenuation of the CNV waveform at sleep onset and its absence in sleep indicates that anticipatory attention requires endogenous conscious control. (shrink)

Attention is often conceived as a gateway to consciousness . Although endogenous spatial attention may be independent of conscious perception , exogenous spatial orienting seems instead to be an important modulator of CP . Here, we investigate the role of auditory alerting in CP in normal observers. We used a behavioral task in which phasic alerting tones were presented either at unpredictable or at predictable time intervals prior to the occurrence of a near-threshold visual target. We find, for the first (...) time in neurologically intact observers, that phasic alertness increases CP, both objectively and subjectively. This result is consistent with evidence showing that phasic alerting can ameliorate the spatial bias exhibited by visual neglect patients . The alerting network may increase the activity of fronto-parietal networks involved in top-down amplification required to bring a stimulus into consciousness. (shrink)

Though dividing one’s attention between two input streams typically impairs performance, detecting a behaviorally relevant stimulus can sometimes enhance the encoding of unrelated information presented at the same time. Previous research has shown that selection of this kind boosts visual cortical activity and memory for concurrent items. An important unanswered question is whether such effects are reflected in processing quality and functional connectivity in visual regions and in the hippocampus. In this fMRI study, participants were asked to memorize a stream (...) of naturalistic images and press a button only when they heard a predefined target tone. Images could be presented with a target tone, with a distractor tone, or without a tone. Auditory target detection increased activity throughout the ventral visual cortex but lowered it in the hippocampus. Enhancements in functional connectivity between the ventral visual cortex and the hippocampus were also observed following auditory targets. Multi-voxel pattern classification of image category was more accurate on target tone trials than on distractor and no tone trials in the fusiform gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus. This effect was stronger in visual cortical clusters whose activity was more correlated with the hippocampus on target tone than on distractor tone trials. In agreement with accounts suggesting that subcortical noradrenergic influences play a role in the attentional boost effect, auditory target detection also caused an increase in locus coeruleus activity and phasic pupil responses. These findings outline a network of cortical and subcortical regions that are involved in the selection and processing of information presented at behaviorally relevant moments. (shrink)

Much modern science and ethics debate is on high-profile problems such as animal organ transplantation, genetic engineering and fetal tissue research, in discourse that assumes technical tones. Other work, such as narrative ethics, expresses the failed promise of technology in the vivid detail of human experience. However, the essential nature of contemporary technology remains largely opaque to our present ethical lens on health care and on society. The limited controversies of modern science and ethics perpetuate ‘technics’, a technical, problem-solving mindset (...) that fails to grapple successfully with the complexity of technology. A critical dialectic between practice and scholarship widens the ethical conversation in nursing to consider technology as an ongoing set of daily and fundamental moral choices on how we live. Critical text on technology recovers ethics from the limits of technics, and assists nurses to develop an inherent knowedge of technology that is needed to provide ethical care in a technological world. (shrink)

IN his recent book on Heidegger's concept of authenticity, Eclipse of the Self, Michael Zimmerman points out Heidegger's life-long attempt to link the theoretical-ontological questions of traditional philosophy with the personal-existential issues of everyday life. The aim of grounding the "question of Being" in a deeper, more authentic way of being human is most strikingly evident in Being and Time. There the seemingly most abstract of all metaphysical questions--What is the meaning of Being?--is posed in terms of the most intensely (...) personal question facing any individual--What is the meaning of human existence? To answer the former question appropriately, Heidegger claims, we must transform our approach to the latter. And this in turn requires a radical alteration in the quality of our lives. Despite Heidegger's insistence that his ontological findings have no evaluative import, the exhortative tone of the account of authenticity is unmistakable. He quotes with full approval Count Yorck's description of his own philosophy: "The practical aim of our standpoint is pedagogical in the broadest sense of the word". Its goal is "to make possible the cultivation of individuality". Emerging out of an age that perceived itself as a time of profound crisis, a period shaken by intellectual currents of relativism, scientific materialism, Darwinism, and the complete secularization of life, Being and Time attempts to combat the "groundlessness" of the contemporary world by uncovering enduring values and meanings within the framework of "worldliness" and human finitude. The "question of Being" is no exercise in arcane speculation; its aim is to restore a sense of the gravity and responsibility of existence by recovering a more profound grasp of what it is to be. (shrink)

Much modern science and ethics debate is on high-profile problems such as animal organ transplantation, genetic engineering and fetal tissue research, in discourse that assumes technical tones. Other work, such as narrative ethics, expresses the failed promise of technology in the vivid detail of human experience. However, the essential nature of contemporary technology remains largely opaque to our present ethical lens on health care and on society. The limited controversies of modern science and ethics perpetuate ‘technics’, a technical, problem-solving mindset (...) that fails to grapple successfully with the complexity of technology. A critical dialectic between practice and scholarship widens the ethical conversation in nursing to consider technology as an ongoing set of daily and fundamental moral choices on how we live. Critical text on technology recovers ethics from the limits of technics, and assists nurses to develop an inherent knowedge of technology that is needed to provide ethical care in a technological world. (shrink)

The editors tell us this book is an outgrowth of their course in philosophical arguments. It contains both readings from traditional sources, and new material especially for this book. It is thus of interest as a potential text, as a source book, and for its original contributions. To consider it first as a text, it would be a challenging and valuable choice for sophisticated students. As a source-book, it is a good anthology of hard-core arguments on seven metaphysical topics. Authors (...) selected include Aristotle, Plato, Church Fathers, Rationalists, Locke and Hume, Bradley and Moore, Kant, Frege, Carnap, C. I. Lewis, Russell, and others. Selections run from a page or two to 16-page Hume excerpts. The last section, on The Nature of Metaphysics, contains essays newly written for this volume by A. J. Ayer, Brand Blanshard, John Passmore, and M. Lazerowitz. Other new material elsewhere in the book includes Alice Ambrose on Wittgenstein, and the introduction by W. E. Kennick. The latter suggests that in metaphysics there are arguments but no proofs, and that metaphysics has four curious characteristics: its disputes are never resolved; in these disputes the array of experts on each side is likely to be equally impressive; antinomies seem unavoidable; and metaphysics frequently conflicts with common sense. Ayer's article is called "Metaphysics and Common Sense." Using Carnap's distinction of "internal" and "external" questions, he finds metaphysical questions to be external. His explanation of what these are and why anyone would wish to raise them yields three legitimate ways in which metaphysics can add to our understanding of the world, and concludes that "it would be a mistake to forego the more imaginative kinds of conceptual exploration." In both tone and content this essay is a surprise for readers who know earlier work by Ayer. Passmore attempts to correct the popular tendency to confuse the philosopher with the sage. He places metaphysics, mathematics, and empirical science within "rational discussion": each is speculation, each has its characteristic control procedure. Blanshard's article attempts to defend metaphysics against criticisms such as those made by Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Freud. Lazerowitz treats the thesis that "metaphysics works by unseen paradoxes."--M. B. M. (shrink)

This is a translation of another volume of the monumental history of philosophy published in the 1930s by Bréhier. The bibliography is brought up to date by the translator with help from Wesley Piersol. Bréhier writes history of philosophy in the broad sense, showing the social, literary, and political forms taken by philosophical trends of the period. Many of the writings treated in this volume will be unknown to students trained in the Anglo-American tradition. There are only fifteen pages on (...) Scottish realism and British utilitarianism, and a page or so each on Kierkegaard and Emerson. In the substantial chapters on Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and the trends in German thought following Hegel, one can find summaries of the positions of such philosophers as von Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Herbart, Feuerbach, Stirner, and others. There is a rich section of over a hundred pages on French social philosophy: Fourier, Saint-Simon, Comte, and Proudhon. Early work of Engels and Marx is mentioned, but fuller treatment belongs to the next volume. A chapter on Italian idealism is also included. This period saw the flowering of vast constructive systems. A sense of history and development transformed philosophical problems, and faith in the rational, reflective initiative of human wills was replaced by faith in a mysterious historical force, an immanent law which makes sport of efforts to resist it. The difference in substance is reflected in differences of style. The clarity and naturalness with which eighteenth-century men of action wrote for a general educated public was replaced by constraint, effort, conventionality, and above all, a prophetic and apocalyptic tone in the works of this time.--M. B. M. (shrink)

Although Ordinary Language Philosophy is widely believed to have disappeared leaving scarcely a trace in this era of formal semantics, it is very much the formal semantics of ordinary language that dominates the scene. More common ground than one might have supposed proves thus to be available for the unreconstructed ordinary language philosopher, in the present volume, to enter into the thick of current discussion. The prevailing tone of the work is certainly much more formal than anything one recalls (...) from the heyday of ordinary language philosophy, and in its episodic fashion the central topics—e.g., reference, opacity, identity, propositions—are standard enough, though by the end an effort has been made to reinstate synonymy, analyticity, and even verificationism. On the specific side of grammar the nominalization of sentences receives extended attention, and it is in that connection that Bede Rundle queries the postulation of propositions as metaphysical objects for the so-called propositional attitudes. The deepest, most pervasive theme of the book turns out to be that of ontological commitment. In an uncharacteristic, refreshing moment of testiness Rundle confides that serious controversy as to whether there are or are not events "just cannot get going unless our ordinary language is supplanted... by the grandiose but ill-defined jargon of ‘ontology'." The focus of the work tends to be blurred owing to a tacit assimilation of Quine to the formal semanticists of ordinary language. If the Quinean framework of ontological commitment would seem to be almost ubiquitous today, the semantic emphasis on the ontological commitments of ordinary language renders the current fashion almost as alien to Quine as to the later Wittgenstein. Rundle is thus faced with a shifting target. His excellent anti-Fregean, quasi-nominalistic discussion of number brings out some of the difficulty. Sensitive to the difference between the nonreferential and referential uses of number words in ordinary language, Rundle argues that one can only go so far with the former. Accordingly, he will allow that "by ordinary standards there quite clearly are numbers", a thesis that neither Wittgenstein nor Quine—for very different reasons—would accept. At the outset of his book Rundle writes as follows, "We could look more favorably upon the pragmatic approach if there were room for a choice, if the analysis of the meaning of, say, sentences seemingly alluding to certain abstractions, left the question of existence undecided. There are reasons for thinking that this cannot be so, and the arguments to come will, I hope, bear out the general objection in particular cases." The discussion of number fails to connect with Quine who readily concedes ordinary language to the nominalist. It is only when one consults such items as sets, which Quine takes to have scarcely any footing in ordinary language, that his pragmatism comes properly into its own. Are the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory analytic or synthetic? Are they perhaps synthetic a priori? Shall we indeed accept them as true? It can hardly be supposed that pre-Quinean approaches, whether empiricist or rationalist, have proved very fruitful here. And what guidance can linguistic analysis provide? (shrink)

Plato's Sophist begins with an attempt to arrive by division at a definition of a Sophist. In the course of the attempt six different descriptions are discussed and the results summarized at 231 c-e. A seventh and final account may be said to occupy the whole of the rest of the dialogue, including the long digression on negative statements. The first five divisions characterize with a considerable amount of satire different types of sophist, or more probably different aspects of the (...) sophistic art. The sixth division is very different. To quote Cornford's words, ‘satire is dropped. The tone is serious and sympathetic, towards the close it becomes eloquent’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Death Perception:How Temporary Ventilator Disconnection Helped my Family Accept Brain Death and Donate OrgansThomas B. FreemanThe night of my nephew’s closed head injury in Boston, I was on call as a neurosurgeon at Tampa General Hospital. I was therefore not shocked at first when my telephone rang at four o’clock in the morning, but I soon understood the severity of the tragic news. The next half hour was a (...) blur of frantic phone calls and devastating decisions leading to surgery to remove a subdural hematoma from my nephew’s head, even though he was only two brain stem reflexes away from brain death.I thought that my experience as a neurosurgeon would somehow help me. However, when my sister–in–law asked me if this was just like the other tragic closed head injuries that I had seen in 26 years of practice, my answer was very simple: this was the only severe closed head injury I had ever seen—in my family. At this point, I was no longer a neurosurgeon. I was an uncle. My nephew’s closed head injury overwhelmed both his brain’s capacity to survive and my entire family’s ability to think rationally or objectively while grieving so intensely.It is in this context that we were asked to consider organ donation. The appeal for organ donation is one of altruism. My nephew’s parents agreed that organ donation would be an important way to honor their son’s life, allow him to make one final contribution to save the lives of several patients, and help to bring peace to the family.I will never forget, however, my niece’s distraught response. She is altruistic by nature, but was tremendously conflicted by the choice to donate her own brother’s organs. At this point, all discussions about organ donation stopped until we could understand the source of her conflict. Since she did not have legal authority regarding the final decision, some family members wondered if organ donation should be allowed if she could not come to terms with the choice. She felt isolated, because she was the only person in the room who was experiencing conflict. As a neurosurgeon, I have always advised other families in this situation that they may have more peace if they can make such decisions unanimously, regardless of who has the ultimate legal authority for decision–making. This helps bring healing to the family, eliminates disruption of family values and unity, and reduces possible feelings of guilt.I asked my niece what she was feeling. She stated something that I had never heard before as a neurosurgeon. She had listened to the words that her brother was brain dead, but she felt that he was somehow still alive, since he was breathing on a ventilator and his heart was beating. She felt powerless due to her inability to do anything more for [End Page 9] him. She also wanted to be there when her brother “died,” which she would recognize by the cessation of his heartbeat. She would not abandon her brother.I searched for a way to respect my niece’s wishes and her legitimate request, while preserving the ability to proceed with organ donation. Solving this conundrum proved to be a pivotal part of the beginning of both her mourning process and acceptance of his death.As an uncle, I experienced the clear dissociation that modern medicine creates between medical care and the natural human process of recognizing and accepting death. My family observed the subtle difference between a deep coma and brain death. They noticed that my nephew’s color had changed when his temperature dropped to 94o F before the heating blanket was placed. They perceived the decrease in muscle tone when he stopped breathing faster than the ventilator rate. Outside of that, there was no significant difference in his appearance when he was “alive” or “dead.”In spite of heroic measures and superlative surgical and medical care, his closed head injury progressed unremittingly until he became brain dead 36 hours later. The diagnosis of “brain death” was pronounced to the family. Accepting the death of someone who is... (shrink)

Modern Moral Problems addresses moral quandaries that can beguile and confuse faithful Catholics. Written in a question-and-answer format, the book covers questions regarding sexuality, medical ethics, business practices, civic responsibilities, and the sacramental life of the Church. The extraordinary assortment of issuesforming a single, organized collectionis a valuable reference for anyone seeking clear and concise answers to tough moral questions. Written in a conversational tone often spliced with humor, this work by a highly respected moral theologian will be read (...) with fascination for its clarity of argument and fundamental good sense. Originally published as a monthly question-and-answer column in a magazine for priests, these selections by Msgr. William B. Smith retain a striking current topicality. Msgr. Smith often tackled matters of controversy in the Catholic Church, ones which continue to draw conflicting opinions. Interesting, informative, and eminently practical, this book conveys an overall impression that sound thinking about morality is rooted in a tradition within the Catholic Church, even when the answers to particular moral questions cannot be found in catechisms or Vatican documents. Msgr. Smith offers a clear-headed approach to the quandaries of our time precisely because of his training in traditional moral principles and his fidelity to the Catholic magisterium. This book should be in the possession of all seminarians and priests, who are bound to confront moral matters that are not so easily decided at first glance. But lay people, too, will find here rich responses to the challenging and sometimes unresolved moral questions they encounter in their own lives. (shrink)

What should we make of the apocalyptic tone taken up by politicians, journalists, scientists, and activists? Some environmental thinkers such as Michael Shellenberger contend that alarming rhetoric distracts us from the technological and governance challenges presented by climate change. In the article, it is argued that retrieving a practical apocalyptic political theology from the Christian tradition can both clarify conceptual contradictions within this discourse as well as offer a practical orientation toward living within ecological endings. Amid the cascade of (...) environmental crises we are living through, apocalyptic practices of renunciation of the world offer a guide and discipline for living in the end. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophical Adventures in the Lands of Oz and EvGareth B. Matthews (bio)Charles Dodgson, using the pen name “Lewis Carroll,” was the first author in English to write philosophical fantasy for children. In naming his first Alice book Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland,1 Lewis Carroll may have been inspired by the famous saying of Aristotle that philosophy begins in wonder. More exactly, what Aristotle said was this: “For it is owing (...) to their wonder (thaumazein) that people both now begin, and first began to philosophize (philosophein)” (Metaphysics I, 1982b12-13). Plato expresses a similar idea in his dialogue Theatetus: “This is an experience characteristic of philosophy,” Plato has Socrates say, “this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else” (155d).A reader might suppose that the wonder Plato and Aristotle thought could stimulate us to do philosophy was a Kantian awe at “the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.”2 But, in fact, the wonder Plato and Aristotle allude to is a surprised recognition that something we thought we understood perfectly well actually presents a challenging perplexity (aporia). So for both Plato and Aristotle, philosophy begins in the wonder at a philosophically interesting perplexity.3 And, indeed, Alice’s adventures in Wonderland are adventures in philosophical perplexity.The first American writer of philosophical fantasy for children was L. Frank Baum, author of The Wonderful Wizard of Oz4 and a number of other Oz books. For Baum philosophical fantasy took a rather different form from the fantasy of Lewis Carroll. This should hardly be surprising. After all, Carroll was a philosopher and an Oxford don whose specialty was logic. The hallmark of his fantasy is clever and thought- provoking [End Page 37] repartee, such as one might hope to hear at high table in an Oxford college. Consider this passage from chapter 7 (“A Mad Tea-Party”) of Alice in Wonderland:“Take some more tea,” the March Hare said to Alice, very earnestly.“I’ve had nothing yet,” Alice replied in an offended tone, “so I can’t take more.”“You mean you can’t take less,” said the Hatter: “it’s very easy to take more than nothing.”5As this passage helps us realize, “A has had more tea than B” is normally taken to imply that, although both A and B have had some tea, the amount that A has had is more than the amount that B has had. However, it can also be taken to mean simply that the amount A has had is more than the amount B has had, even where, in the case of B, that amount is zero. Or consider this exchange from chapter 6 (“Humpty-Dumpty”) of Through the Looking-Glass:“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’” Alice said.Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously, “Of course you don’t—till I tell you.I meant ‘There’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’”“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’” Alice objected.“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone,“it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”6This characteristically clever and amusing exchange forces readers to make a distinction between lexical meaning and speaker meaning. Of course the word “glory” does not mean “there’s a nice knock-down argument for you,” but what a speaker might mean to communicate by using the word “glory” is another issue. Moreover, the relationship between lexical meaning and speaker meaning is a very interesting issue in linguistics and the philosophy of language.Nothing like this clever repartee is to be found in the Oz books. Nor should that fact be very surprising. Frank Baum never took a philosophy course; he never even went to college. He was a theater producer and journalist. Yet, despite this lack of academic background, perhaps the most striking feature7 of Baum’s writing—something almost universally ignored in the scholarly literature on Baum... (shrink)

318 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 36:2 APRIL 1998 stress should not be placed on Spinoza's excommunication . One among many who held radical views and during a period of unrest brought on by an influx of emigration, Spinoza was dealt the same punishment as those who failed to pay their communal dues. The apt conclusion drawn is that from the perspective of the commu- nity, this excommunication was of no great significance. Such history corrects earlier interpretations and helps (...) readers to approach primary texts through the introduction of the problems and issues of the specific period. Devoting almost six hundred pages to ancient and medieval philosophy, the last third of the history is given over to modern and contemporary thought. Seymour Feldman's clear account of Spinoza sets the tone for Michael L. Morgan's presentation of Mendelssohn and Mordecai Finley's account of German Reform philosophy. Both represent stages in the accommodation of Judaism to the Enlightenment. What is important to keep in mind here and what becomes clear in the text is that Jewish philosophers were not just appropriators of the Enlightenment, but played central roles in its formation. Harry Lesser and David Ellenson present the other side of the story through balanced accounts of the emergence of Jewish Orthodoxy as a response to Reform philosophy. Continuing where Julius Guttmann left off in his classic history translated as Philoso- phies of Judaism.. (shrink)

This is a collection of twenty-seven essays written by its author between 1962 and 1989 on topics in the history of science, the philosophy of science, and "the relevance of scientific practice to other parts of philosophy and culture". Twenty-one have been previously published, the remainder hitherto aired only as public presentations. The papers are gathered under six section-headings, including "Explanation," "Hume's Problem," "Logic and Causality," "Machines and Practices," "Scientific Knowledge--Its Scope and Limits," and "Science and Subjectivity"; yet their actual (...) range is both more diverse and less in keeping with prevailing currents in the philosophy of science than these tidily familiar rubrics suggest. "Explanation," for example, flirts with mainstream subject-matter in a much deserved encomium to Hempel's contributions in philosophy of science that reaches beyond the titular subject to the whole of Hempel's work. The section also embraces a discussion of General Systems Theory that distinguishes a doctrinaire, a prioristic approach to the study of science from a pragmatic-pluralistic version, urging the ills of the former and the virtues of the latter. It culminates in two presentations of the view that the theory of evolution rests on "circumstantial evidence" only as it involves the "logical fallacy" of "the inference of causes from effects" : the one is a historical piece on the little-known nineteenth-century naturalist, Phillip Henry Gosse, highlighting his creationistic "Omphalos" theory of the origins of biological species and the fossil record; the other is a short treatment of some conceptual issues involved in the creationist controversy. If the remaining five sections are not so heterogeneous in the scatter of subjects on which their articles touch, they are for the most part more idiosyncratic in the issues they address, the questions they raise, and the answers they suggest. Typical are "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," an argument for the ultimacy of subjectivity on the basis of relativity theory, and "Truth and Presence," explicating the attempt of Gaston Bachelard to blend science and poetry as complementary aspects of the human imagination. Sometimes they are also eyebrow-raising. "The Paradox of Induction and the Inductive Wager," would "show the impossibility of... logical proof [of the principle of induction]... by locating it among the paradoxes". Caw's case for paradox is simply that if inductive inference is legitimate then our past inability to justify such inference warrants the inductive conclusion that we shall never be able to justify it. But even if nothing else were suspect in this argument, its force is presumably at most probabilistic, making it hard to see how it could establish the "impossibility" of anything. Another paper, "Three Logics, or the Possibility of the Improbable," concerns "the logic of incredible events", touting the merits of so construing the natural world that events with zero probability occasionally occur and initiate spontaneous causal chains. Yet it is thoroughly unclear what interpretation of probability theory could both license identifying uncaused with impossible events and yet allow that such events may occur. Still another, "Rethinking Intentionality," includes the puzzling contention that "there can't be a science of intention because science presupposes intention". Unlike these last examples, most of the essays in the collection are provocative rather than upsetting, bearing the earmark of the independent, iconoclastic, speculative mind from which they spring, a former physicist not aligned with any of the current schools in philosophy of science, and more influenced by the classic giants of the Western philosophical tradition and by Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre than by empiricist philosophers of science or the recent analytic tradition. Thus, it is no surprise that the issues Caws addresses are nonstandard, and that his manner of addressing them embodies a looser, more broad-stroked, more humanistic, and more metaphysically self-conscious approach than is common in recent mainstream philosophy of science. This orientation doubtless accounts, too, for the somewhat subjective-idealistic stance, the view that one cannot definitively progress beyond one's own sensations and ideas, argued in "Yorick's World or the Universe in a Single Skull," and manifest in the tone, substance, and central thrust of a number of the essays in the collection. It is thus appropriate that Caws should have borrowed from this title to name the anthology itself.-Robert B. Barrett, Washington University in St. Louis. (shrink)

The political writings of Kant and of Hegel present two contrasts, whose connection and explanation have never been adequately explored. The first contrast is in respect of the quality of their discussions of ‘home’ politics—in Kant's language, the ‘problem of establishing a perfect civic constitution’. Here Hegel shines. However much one may dislike the tone of voice, the vocabulary, the style and the arrangement of its arguments, his Philosophy of Right , especially when supplemented by his more topical political (...) writings, presents an array of dicta, judgments and arguments of notable penetration, balance and prescience. Consider for instance his account of the very different political functions of free associations and of representative bodies, and his perception of the symbolic—but crucially symbolic—role of head of state. On these, as on many other issues, Hegel's views deserve the credit that has of late begun to be restored to them. Whatever his philosophical failings, he had a remarkable sense of the key junctures of different strands in the life of politics; so that, although the kind of state he describes and admires retains little practical relevance today, his exposition of it remains a valuable training-ground in political appreciation. By contrast Kant's philosophy of the state, as we find it in Part II of his Philosophy of Right , in Part II of Theory and Practice and in Appendices I and II of Perpetual Peace , is at first sight little more than an academic exercise. It amounts to a restatement, in dehistoricized terms and in accordance with Kant's rationalist theory of morals, of Rousseau's central political teachings, viz. that an original, unanimous, unrescindable contract explains political allegiance, and that the idea of a General Will is a sufficient criterion of political justice within the state. From these two basic positions Kant develops a theory of civic obedience far more restrictive than that of Rousseau or indeed than that of Hobbes. Throughout, Kant accepts—in the spirit which one might accord to revelation—Rousseau's assumptions that government can be confined to issues that fall under a General Will, and that such a Will can be ‘found’ for the resolution of every political issue, so that honest men need never disagree about what the General Will is. But to say this is to say that Kant's concern with home politics is little more than academic. (shrink)

The Hermopolis letters showcase the personal concerns of those writing Aramaic letters in the era of Persian Egypt. One individual named Nabuša is particularly interesting because of his familial correspondence and emotional tone. This study will examine what can be known about this writer and his complaints about an unwanted tunic and a snakebite. There have been several notable disagreements about the Aramaic translation of Nabuša’s concerns, whose discussion will help heighten our understanding of his passion.

Media exposure influences mental health symptomology in response to salient aversive events, like terrorist attacks, but little has been done to explore the impact of news coverage that varies more subtly in affective content. Here, we utilized an existing data set in which participants self-reported physical symptoms, depressive symptoms, and anxiety symptoms, and completed a potentiated startle task assessing their physiological reactivity to aversive stimuli at three time points (waves) over a 9-month period. Using a computational linguistics approach, we then (...) calculated an average ratio of words with positive vs. negative affective connotations for only articles from news sources to which each participant self-reported being exposed over the prior 2 weeks at each wave of data collection. As hypothesized, individuals exposed to news coverage with more negative affective tone over the prior 2 weeks reported significantly greater physical and depressive symptoms, and had significantly greater physiological reactivity to aversive stimuli. (shrink)

Restating an interlocutor’s position in an incredulous tone of voice can sometimes serve legitimate dialectical ends. However, there are cases in which incredulous restatement is out of bounds. This article provides an analysis of one common instance of the inappropriate use of incredulous restatement, which the authors call “modus tonens.” The authors argue that modus tonens is vicious because it pragmatically implicates the view that one’s interlocutor is one’s cognitive subordinate and provides a cue to like-minded onlookers that dialectical (...) opponents are not to be treated as epistemic peers. (shrink)

Leaders play a critical role in setting the tone for ethical climate in organizations. In recent years, there has been an increased skepticism about the role played by corporate executives in developing and implementing ethics in business practices. Sales and marketing practices of businesses, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry, have come under increased scrutiny. This study identifies a type of leadership style that can help firms develop an ethical climate. Responses from 333 salespeople working for a North American subsidiary (...) of an international pharmaceutical company were used to analyze the impact of instrumental leadership on ethical climate. We also examined the effect of ethical climate on effort, satisfaction with the supervisor, and job satisfaction. Managerial implications are provided. (shrink)

I was surprised to note the critical tone of the discussion which my friend Leonard B. Meyer recently devoted in these pages to an article on the relation of art and science that I wrote for a popular scientific magazine. For I had believed all the while that in my article I was merely presenting to a general scientific audience a watered-down version of what I thought were Meyer's own views. Evidently I was mistaken in that belief, though I (...) have been unable to fathom just where I went wrong in interpreting Meyer's earlier writings, which, more than any other source, are the provenance of my ideas about the nature of art. Gunther S. Stent, professor of molecular biology at the University of California, Berkeley, is the author of Molecular Biology of Bacterial Viruses, Phage and the Origin of Molecular Biology, Molecular Genetics: An Introductory Narrative, The Coming of the Golden Age: A View of the End of Progress, and many important scientific papers. In Concerning the Sciences, the Arts—AND the Humanities" , Leonard B. Meyer took issue with views expressed by Professor Stent in "Prematurity and Uniqueness in Scientific Discovery," published in Scientific American. (shrink)

Among young liberal Catholic intellectuals, Lonergan is held in extremely high esteem. His philosophic treatise, Insight, is considered to be the important philosophic book where Thomism genuinely encounters contemporary secular philosophy. But outside this circle of Catholic intellectuals Lonergan's thought is barely known. This collection of articles does reflect the comprehensiveness and depth of his thought. Papers range over intricate theological discussions of the Assumption, Christ, marriage, the role of a Catholic university in the modern world, and technical philosophic issues (...) such as the form of inference and geometric possibility. Because the papers are short and have been written for a variety of audiences, it is difficult to discern any overreaching continuity and perspective. Many of the discussions demand a more thorough and critical analysis than is exhibited here. The introduction by Crowe is helpful for reconstructing Lonergan's intellectual development and supplying a broader context for appreciating the papers, although the tone is more reverential than critical.—R. J. B. (shrink)

This, the third volume in The Pelican History of the Church, offers an extremely perspicacious view of the entire period. While there were nationalistic, economic, and political interests responsible for the Reformation and while there was no one, simple religious motivation, underlying all of these causes was a profound dissatisfaction with the moral and religious tone of late medieval society. However haltingly and destructively the Reformation proceeded, it is evident that the result was a general strengthening of authentic religious (...) life in both Protestant and Catholic countries. And where the state assumed some of the secular functions of the medieval Church this seemed to eventually benefit both Church and State. However, Chadwick does not gloss over grosser aspects of the period: the so-called wars of religion, the endless and destructive polemics between churches, and the ruthless confiscation of ecclesiastical property. If greedy lords helped free the Church from the mammon of iniquity, this was accompanied by cultural and artistic losses with no improvement in the lot of the poor country cleric despite the reduced status of the wealthy bishop or abbot. Chadwick is particularly good in his descriptions of the relationship of the political to the religious. But what is of special interest are the sometimes bewildered and reactionary responses of the little Christian to the dramatic events of the time.—D. J. B. (shrink)

This is a tough-minded book, written in a clear, even-toned, flat and uncompromising style. There are no concessions to time and place: all is a matter of true premises and valid argument. Sainsbury presents Russell's arguments in a manner always cogent, usually lucid and occasionally with remarkable insight. More perhaps than in other volumes in this series, the arguments are not only of the philosopher at hand, but pre-eminently for professional philosophers. The arguments are for the most part those adduced (...) by Russell in support of his doctrines of logical atomism and hence for various claims about language, knowledge, and the world. Sainsbury has deliberately chosen to limit his discussion to these topics, thus omitting reference to Russell's moral and political philosophy and to some topics in philosophical psychology. The choice was a useful one, enabling Sainsbury to trace themes beginning in chapters on "Meaning," "Names," "Descriptions," and "The Perfect Language," to those on "Knowledge," "Ontology," and "Mathematics.". (shrink)

Individuals typically produce auditory sequences, such as speech or music, at a consistent spontaneous rate or tempo. We addressed whether spontaneous rates would show patterns of convergence across the domains of music and language production when the same participants spoke sentences and performed melodic phrases on a piano. Although timing plays a critical role in both domains, different communicative and motor constraints apply in each case and so it is not clear whether music and speech would display similar timing mechanisms. (...) We report the results of two experiments in which adult participants produced sequences from memory at a comfortable spontaneous (uncued) rate. In Experiment 1, monolingual pianists in Buffalo, New York engaged in three production tasks: speaking sentences from memory, performing short melodies from memory, and tapping isochronously. In Experiment 2, English-French bilingual pianists in Montréal, Canada produced melodies on a piano as in Experiment 1, and spoke short rhythmically-structured phrases repeatedly. Both experiments led to the same pattern of results. Participants exhibited consistent spontaneous rates within each task. People who produced one spoken phrase rapidly were likely to produce another spoken phrase rapidly. This consistency across stimuli was also found for performance of different musical melodies. In general, spontaneous rates across speech and music tasks were not correlated, whereas rates of tapping and music were correlated. Speech rates (for syllables) were faster than music rates (for tones) and speech showed a smaller range of spontaneous rates across individuals than did music or tapping rates. Taken together, these results suggest that spontaneous rate reflects cumulative influences of endogenous rhythms (in consistent self-generated rates within domain), peripheral motor constraints (in finger movements across tapping and music), and communicative goals based on the cultural transmission of auditory information (slower rates for to-be-synchronized music than for speech). (shrink)

This demonstration recreates an example of introspective training from E.B. Titchener's laboratory manual of 1901-1905. The purpose is to prompt thought about the prospects of introspective training as a means of improving the quality of introspective reports about conscious experience. The demonstration requires speakers or headphones, and a high-speed internet connection is recommended.

This book is a meticulous study of Aristotle's phronesis and its applications to the fields of personal development or character formation and of ethical ...

Single units that are not related to the desired task can become related to the task by conditioning their firing rates. We theorized that, during conditioning of firing rates to a tone, (a) unrelated single units would be recruited to the task; (b) the recruitment would depend on the phase of the task; (c) tones of different frequencies would produce different patterns of single unit recruitment. In our mute locked-in participant, we conditioned single units using tones of different frequencies (...) emitted from a tone generator. The conditioning task had three phases: Listen to the tone for 20 s, then silently sing the tone for 10 s, with a prior control period of resting for 10 s. Twenty single units were recorded simultaneously while feedback of one of the twenty single units was made audible to the mute locked-in participant. The results indicate that (a) some of the non-audible single units were recruited during conditioning, (b) some were recruited differentially depending on the phase of the paradigm (listen, rest, or silent sing), and (c) single unit firing patterns were specific for different tone frequencies such that the tone could be recognized from the pattern of single unit firings. These data are important when conditioning single unit firings in brain-computer interfacing tasks because they provide evidence that increased numbers of previously unrelated single units can be incorporated into the task. This incorporation expands the bandwidth of the recorded single unit population and thus enhances the brain-computer interface. This is the first report of conditioning of single unit firings in a human participant with a brain to computer implant. (shrink)

The article discusses relationships and contexts for "reason", "knowledge", and virtue in Aristotle, based on and elaborating some results from Eikeland. It positions Eikeland in relation to Moss but with a side view to Cammick, Kristjansson, and Taylor. These all seem to disagree among themselves but still agree partly in different ways with Eikeland. The text focuses on two questions: 1) the role or tasks of "reason", "knowledge", and "virtue" respectively in setting the end or goal for (...) ethical deliberation, and more generally, 2) the role of dialogue or dialectics in Aristotle's philosophy, including its role concerning question one. The author argues that phrónêsis needs to be interpreted in the context of the totality of Aristotle's philosophy, and explains how this totality is fundamentally dialectical. (shrink)

The original article, which first appeared in Norwegian, is a detailed study of anamnesis or recollection in Plato and Aristotle. It discusses, first, how recollection is relevant for the understanding of central aspects of the philosophy of Aristotle, and then discusses how the “regained” Platonic-Aristotelian concept of anamnesis can be related to current methodological challenges in modern social research. After having received feedback on the original article from David Bloch, who has recently translated and commented the Aristotelian text “On memory (...) and recollection”, I have decided to rewrite it in English and publish it here. (shrink)